TEMPEST Radio Station: Data Exfiltration via Electromagnetic Leakage
Paz Hameiri turns computer display hardware into a software-controlled radio transmitter, exfiltrating data from air-gapped systems via unintended electromagnetic radiation.
Summary
The Principles of TEMPEST and Electromagnetic Leakage
Electronic circuits unintentionally emit electromagnetic radiation during high-speed operations, creating side-channel leakage risks for highly secured and air-gapped environments.
Weaponizing Display Interfaces as Radio Emitters
Paz Hameiri develops dedicated malware that modulates screen pixel patterns and display cable signaling frequencies to generate controlled radio frequency (RF) emissions.
Receiving Air-Gapped Data with Commodity Radios
By tuning a nearby software-defined radio or handheld receiver to harmonic frequencies, an attacker intercepts and demodulates keystrokes, encryption keys, and sensitive documents transmitted over the air.
Defensive Shielding and Zone Interventions
Hameiri presents EM shielding standards, acoustic dampening, and software-level frequency dithering techniques to neutralize TEMPEST emissions.
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