All your keyboards are belong to us!
Tutorial on keyboard attack vectors, ranging from hardware keyloggers and Van Eck phreaking electromagnetic emanations to acoustic typing eavesdropping.
Summary
Keyboard Attack Vectors and Data Interception
Attacking keyboards allows adversaries to capture plaintext credentials and confidential input before cryptographic encryption takes place. Intercepting keystrokes at the physical interface bypasses complex network and application security controls.
Hardware Keylogging and Inline Interceptors
Physical keyloggers installed between the keyboard cable and computer port log raw keystroke scancodes to non-volatile memory. Modern inline hardware implants leverage wireless transmitters or cellular modems for remote keystroke exfiltration.
Electromagnetic Emanations and Van Eck Phreaking
Unshielded keyboard cables and internal microcontroller traces emit subtle electromagnetic radiation during typing. By tuning software-defined radios to these unintended emanations, attackers can reconstruct keystrokes from meters away without physical contact.
Acoustic Eavesdropping and Side-Channel Analysis
Differences in key acoustics allow machine learning models trained on audio recordings to identify individual keystrokes based on typing sound signatures. Defending against keyboard side-channel attacks requires physical inspection, shielded hardware, and acoustic noise generation.
Related talks
Wireless Village·33 min
Travis Goodspeed
Travis Goodspeed provides an update on the Goodwatch open-source wrist-worn RF radio hacking and packet manipulation platform.
Main Stage·43 min
Yaniv Balmas · Lior Oppenheim
Yaniv Balmas and Lior Oppenheim demonstrate reverse engineering KVM switch firmware, subverting the 8051 microcontroller to install an undetectable, persistent hardware keylogger.
Creator Stage·43 min
Zoltan Balazs
Surveys pervasive architectural and implementation failures in consumer IoT gadgets, highlighting cleartext credentials, command injections, and insecure defaults.


