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Exploring Linux Memory Manipulation for Stealth and Evasion

Carlos PolopJavier Gutierrez

Carlos Polop and Javier Gutierrez demonstrate novel in-memory manipulation techniques on Linux to execute stealthy payloads within read-only and distroless containers.

Summary

Exploitation Challenges in Hardened Linux Environments

Modern container deployments increasingly utilize read-only root filesystems, `noexec` volume mounts, and minimal distroless base images to restrict attacker payload execution.

Manipulating Linux Memory Without Executable Disk Files

Carlos Polop and Javier Gutierrez explore advanced in-memory execution primitives, abusing `ptrace`, `/proc/self/mem`, and fileless shared memory file descriptors (`memfd_create`).

Process Injection and Runtime Code Patching

Step-by-step demonstrations illustrate how malicious implants can inject shellcode into running daemon memory spaces, hook dynamic symbols, and evade container security monitors.

Mitigations and Container Hardening

The authors discuss defensive countermeasures, including restricting `ptrace_scope`, deploying Seccomp system call filters, and implementing kernel-level memory integrity auditing.

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