Phantom Attack: Evading System Call Monitoring
Rex Guo and Junyuan Zeng present the Phantom Attack, exploiting implementation flaws in Linux system call tracing frameworks to completely blind endpoint monitoring agents.
Summary
System Call Monitoring in Modern Linux EDRs
Host-based security agents and EDR solutions on Linux monitor system calls (via `ptrace`, auditd, or eBPF) to detect unauthorized reconnaissance, privilege escalation, and lateral movement.
Discovering Inconsistencies in Kernel Tracing Subsystems
Rex Guo and Junyuan Zeng uncover architectural race conditions and state desynchronizations in how the Linux kernel handles traced system calls from unprivileged userland processes.
Executing the Phantom Attack to Blind Sensors
The Phantom Attack allows an attacker without root privileges to execute arbitrary system calls—such as file modification, socket creation, and process execution—while presenting completely benign telemetry to monitoring agents.
Hardening Linux Kernel Tracing Frameworks
The authors propose kernel-level synchronization patches and EDR detection enhancements to mitigate system call spoofing.
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