You Just Got A CTI Program Funded. Now What?
Where
Talks
hack.lu 2024
Duration
24 min
Shows how a Lithuanian SOC built a threat intelligence program from scratch, including mistakes, tooling and success metrics.
Summary
The speaker, a technical product manager at a Lithuanian managed security provider, explains what happened after their cyber threat intelligence program received EU co-financing. When work began, the SOC had a small team, a MISP instance fed by little useful intelligence, and no real intelligence cycle. Regional geopolitical pressure and a wave of attacks on crowdfunding supporters made the need clear.
The team measured its starting maturity with the SOC-CMM model, reviewed intelligence requirements against a commercial handbook, and automated ticket creation from existing incident, OSINT and hunting workflows. They also tried to launch a sharing community early, which drew no takers because many local organisations lacked a sharing platform. Several missteps are highlighted: focusing on requirements and sharing before internal data was solid, building the process inside Jira, which became far more expensive after pricing changes, and fragile automation. Narrowing feeds to a few trusted sources cut alert volume sharply, and about 200 hand-verified events were eventually shared.
The main takeaways are to start with one data source, use free resources such as FIRST feeds and public vendor blog feeds, define actions before requirements, and secure lab infrastructure early. Success is measured through SOC metrics such as reduced triage time and fewer false positives, reviewed quarterly against the maturity model.
Related talks
Talks·43 min
Nicklas Keijser · Mattias Wåhlén
Traces a Rust-based ESXi ransomware group from a small-company breach back to its affiliate model and forum launch.
Talks·1 hr 2 min
Marina Krotofil
Traces how leaked Russian military cyber files expose state-directed operations and what defenders should learn from them.
Talks·5 min
Deborah Servili
Shows a lightning-talk tour of badly shared indicators of compromise and why machine-readable formats matter.


