Trust, but Verify: Auditing Proprietary DRE Systems

Architecture and Background

Robert J. Hansen: Trust, But Verify: Auditing Proprietary DRE Systems Abstract: In 2006 the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) rid the country of lever voting machines and punchcard ballots, and gave the states enormous budgets for buying electronic voting machines. What's still unresolved is how these electronic voting machines are going to be audited.

Vulnerability Analysis

Trying to keep track of many different vendors, each of which has many different machines, is like getting lost in a funhouse hall of mirrors. Yet, there is good news. The National Science Foundation has established a research group for electronic voting, ACCURATE.

Exploitation and Demonstrations

In this presentation, an ACCURATE researcher will start talking about the thorny problem of making sure voting machines are playing fair. Existing technologies, both proprietary and open source, will be criticized; and new technologies will be presented. Bio: Robert J.

Remediation and Defensive Strategies

Hansen has a Bachelor of Arts in Computer Science, Cornell College, 1998. Master of Computer Science, the University of Iowa, 2006. Chief Security Geek for Yomu Inc., 2000. Cryptographic Engineer for PGP Security, 2000-2001. Student at the University of Iowa pursuing a Ph.D. in computer security, 2002-present.