Optical Espionage: Using Lasers to Hear Keystrokes Through Glass Windows
Physics and engineering behind using lasers and optical sensors to recover keystrokes from vibrations on window glass.
Summary
Physical Signals and Data Exfiltration
Sashay away from this talk with the knowledge to perform state-of-the-art espionage, no technical background required.
Laser Eavesdropping Physics
In the realm of privilege escalation and data exfiltration, the physical world quietly screams secrets. We'll demystify the fascinating physics behind signals and how various forms of energy--infrared, visible, and ultraviolet light, radio, ultrasound, audible sound, mechanical vibration, and temperature--can be interpreted as waves that unintentionally leak information, even in air-gapped (non-networked) systems. We'll observe how air is in fact not an effective gap or barrier as radio, light, sound, and vibration excitedly travel through it. We'll explore how all electrical signals radiate electromagnetism (light or radio) that can be intercepted and how we can reverse this process, producing electromagnetism to inject desired electrical signals into our target.
Demodulation and Keystroke Recovery
We'll delve into historical and seminal side-channel/TEMPEST attacks from our friends at the NSA, KGB, and past DEF CON pioneers. You'll learn about the essential electrical and optical components combined for cutting-edge eavesdropping, including what our target is typing from a distance.
While others believe they're obtaining noise, we will extract signal, and you'll leave this talk hearing the world in a new light.
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