News From the 2600net IRC Network and Facebook Group

This talk looks back over more than two decades of the 2600net IRC network and the 2600 Facebook group that grew alongside it. The speakers start with the network's origins after an earlier IRC service went offline, then explain how a volunteer team rebuilt it around a small set of standardized server software. A central rule adopted during the rebuild was that the operators must know everyone who runs infrastructure, after an unidentified host was removed from the network.

The middle of the talk covers the hard parts: DDoS attacks that kept the network down for long stretches, a rumored breach that turned out to be a joke about leaked old password hashes, trolls and long-lived botnets, and a failed attempt to introduce a warrant canary. The Facebook group was lost when its original admin died and his account was taken over through SMS verification, and the team later rebuilt it into a much larger group. The speakers also described a disinformation effort that used around 20,000 fake profiles and the way AI-generated spam started appearing in the group.

The closing part focuses on practices a small community can apply. The network keeps no logs beyond short diagnostic windows, expires inactive accounts after two years, encrypts data at rest, and keeps its attack surface small with a tightly limited set of exposed services. Plans for the future include adding Tor and I2P access, dual DNS, and better moderation for public channels. The main takeaway is that minimal data retention, least privilege and documented procedures help a volunteer network survive hostile conditions over the long term.