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Weaponizing Uselessness - Breaking SMM with the Slowest Instruction Ever Written

Christopher Tomas

Where

Main Stage
DEF CON 34

Duration

21 min

Shows how stretching a single x86 instruction past one second can break System Management Mode's core rendezvous and expose dormant firmware CVEs.

Summary

The talk starts with an unusual goal: find the slowest possible x86 machine instruction. The speaker explains System Management Mode, a privileged firmware-level mode that sits below the kernel and is hidden from the operating system and hypervisor. SMM relies on a rendezvous in which every core must enter together. That rendezvous has a timeout of about one second, so if one core stays outside SMM long enough, the others proceed anyway. Defeating it requires one instruction that stalls longer than a second.

The speaker works through a leaderboard of candidates. Simple arithmetic, square roots, serializing instructions, entropy depletion, model-specific registers and cache write-backs all fall short. Port I/O and then memory-mapped I/O go much further. Misaligned and oversized accesses, wide SIMD registers and a full floating-point state restore push the cost higher still. The final step has other cores hammer the same address with locked accesses to contend for the system bus, reaching roughly 198 billion cycles, or about 49 seconds. A scaled-down version then desynchronized SMM entry across cores in a live demonstration.

The takeaway is that the rendezvous assumption fails, which would expose a large set of time-of-check to time-of-use SMM vulnerabilities that are mostly unpatched. The impact covers confidential computing in the cloud and firmware persistence on client systems. The speaker argues there is no clean fix. Keeping the timeout leaves the attack open, while removing it lets one stuck core hang the whole platform.

Materials

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