Locked Sky Boats (simplified)
Where
Main Stage
Disobey 2023
Duration
52 min
Explains how aircraft are engineered and where cybersecurity fits, from redundancy and building blocks to segregation and testing.
Summary
The talk walks through how aircraft are designed, built and operated, and where cybersecurity engineering fits into that process. The speaker, who has an avionics background and has worked on aircraft security at a manufacturer and as a consultant, starts with why aircraft fly and how aviation has moved toward more automation, digital flight documents and tighter connectivity. The speaker notes that fewer crew members now carry more responsibility, which raises human-factors questions when systems fail.
The middle section covers the engineering lifecycle. Aircraft are assembled from interdependent components, and design is iterative: interfaces must match, and parts that do not fit are rebuilt. Redundancy is a key safety tool, but duplicated systems should use dissimilar hardware or software so that one flaw does not disable every copy. Shared multi-core platforms raise a central security concern, because safety-critical avionics must stay separated from passenger networks. Segregation with controlled boundaries and defense in depth address this. Security testing on aircraft relies on detailed test plans and, where possible, isolated test environments, since operational aircraft cannot be probed freely.
The closing part looks at operations, incident coordination and regulation, including a new European requirement for information security management. The speaker's takeaways are to treat security as end to end, not to trust any interface by default, and to explain security in terms engineering teams can act on without frightening them away.
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