CPDLC Man-in-the-Middle Attacks in Modern Air Traffic Control
Joshua Smailes demonstrates injecting forged digital air traffic control messages via CPDLC, executing man-in-the-middle attacks on oceanic flights.
Summary
The Transition to Digital Air Traffic Control Communications
Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) replaces noisy analog HF/VHF voice communications with direct digital text messaging between pilots and controllers.
The Lack of Cryptographic Authentication in CPDLC
Joshua Smailes analyzes the underlying VDL Mode 2 and ATN protocol stacks, revealing complete absence of message encryption, integrity signing, or mutual authentication.
Executing Airborne Message Injection and Redirection Attacks
Using a software-defined radio, an attacker can broadcast forged ATC clearance messages (such as altitude or route modifications) directly into cockpit flight management systems.
Evaluating Human Detection and Cryptographic Upgrades
Smailes evaluates why flight crews fail to identify subtle forged instructions, presenting proposals for integrating public key infrastructure into future aviation data links.
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