Jackpotting Automated Teller Machines Redux

Architecture and Background

Barnaby Jack - Jackpotting Automated Teller Machines Redux The presentation "Jackpotting Automated Teller Machines" was originally on the schedule at Black Hat USA 2009. Due to circumstances beyond my control, the talk was pulled at the last minute. The upside to this is that there has been an additional year to research ATM attacks, and I'm armed with a whole new bag of tricks.

Vulnerability Analysis

I've always liked the scene in Terminator 2 where John Connor walks up to an ATM, interfaces his Atari to the card reader and retrieves cash from the machine. I think I've got that kid beat. The most prevalent attacks on Automated Teller Machines typically involve the use of card skimmers, or the physical theft of the machines themselves.

Exploitation and Demonstrations

Rarely do we see any targeted attacks on the underlying software. Last year, there was one ATM; this year, I'm doubling down and bringing two new model ATMs from two major vendors. I will demonstrate both local and remote attacks, and I will reveal a multi-platform ATM rootkit.

Remediation and Defensive Strategies

Finally, I will discuss protection mechanisms that ATM manufacturers can implement to safeguard against these attacks. Barnaby Jack is the Director of Research at IOActive Labs, where he focuses on exploring new and emerging threats, and recommending areas in which to concentrate IOActive's research efforts. Jack has over 10 years experience in the security research space and previously held research positions at Juniper Networks, eEye digital Security, and FoundStone. Over the course of his career, Jack has targeted everything from low-level Windows drivers to the exploitation of Automated Teller Machines. He has subsequently been credited with the discovery of numerous vulnerabilities, and has published multiple papers on new exploitation methods and techniques. For copies of the slides and additional materials please see the DEF CON 18 Archive here: