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Behavior Based Defense in ICS Environments

Joe Slowik

Behavior Based Defense in ICS Environments

Summary

### The Evolution of ICS Threat Landscapes At 00:00, adversary hunter and industrial cybersecurity researcher Joe Slowik examines behavior-based defense strategies for securing critical infrastructure at the ICS Village. Slowik outlines how targeted OT threats have matured beyond opportunistic malware toward highly capable nation-state campaigns.

### Moving Beyond Signatures and Indicators of Compromise At 08:58, Slowik discusses the fundamental limitations of static indicators of compromise (IOCs) such as file hashes and known IP addresses. Sophisticated adversaries rapidly mutate their tooling and leverage living-off-the-land techniques, rendering traditional perimeter signature defenses largely ineffective in critical environments.

### Identifying Adversary Lateral Movement and Credential Access At 17:52, the presentation analyzes adversary behavior within converged IT/OT networks. Slowik illustrates how attackers abuse administrative tools, PowerShell scripts, WMI routines, and credential harvesting utilities like Mimikatz across intermediate jump hosts before attempting to bridge into operational control networks.

### Industrial Protocol Anomaly Detection and Process Disruption Concluding between 26:23 and 35:00, Slowik details how defenders can identify malicious intent at the process level. By monitoring engineering command structures, uncharacteristic polling behaviors, and unauthorized PLC reprogramming sequences, defenders can disrupt attacks before adversaries induce physical equipment damage or service outages.

(AI summary — Gemini Flash)

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