I am the Cavalry

The recording opens with a LoRa-based emergency broadcast project built on cheap radios. The presenters argue that sirens and SaaS notification tools are expensive or unreliable when power, phones and internet fail, and they propose a one-way, digitally signed alert channel. They demonstrate low-cost receiver nodes that blink or buzz on high-priority messages and cover build costs and range limits.

Later sessions move to critical infrastructure. One speaker traces intrusions into internet-exposed water utility controllers and explains how adversaries use rotating proxy networks, which makes indicator blocking ineffective and makes takedowns temporary. Another covers data center load growth on the electric grid, oscillation events, and the share of grid hardware sourced from adversarial countries. A further session describes a 100-day effort to help under-resourced operational technology operators reduce risk, and CISA outlines CI Fortify, which asks operators to isolate their systems and test recovery without phones or internet.

The day closes with a discussion of abandoned devices. Speakers argue that vendors should disclose support windows, keep end-of-life products safe, and reconsider the costs they push onto customers, and another talk urges designing infrastructure to be disposable and distributed rather than irreplaceable. The practical takeaways are to plan for degraded communications, rehearse recovery, and treat vendor support lifecycles as a security risk.