Human Augmentation: Hacking Human Perception and Performance With Technology
Where
Talks
HOPE_16
Duration
54 min
Explores how sensory and medical augmentation devices could be attacked, from brain-stimulation research to implant threats.
Summary
Dr. Vimal opens with a survey of the neuroscience behind human augmentation. He moves from invasive methods, such as electrode implants and chemical manipulation of brain circuits, toward less invasive options like cochlear implants, transcranial stimulation, and sensory substitution through the skin or tongue. He explains how the brain's adaptability means almost any sensory input can reshape perception, and describes his NASA-funded work using vibrotactile cues to counter spatial disorientation in simulated weightlessness. He also raises ethical concerns about unregulated neural devices and how stimulation can shift behavior and judgment.
The second half, led by Potter and Palmer, takes an offensive view. They group threats into privacy breaches from passive listening, active interference that changes how a device behaves, and data poisoning that hides an attack's effects. Examples include an insulin pump recall tied to a cybersecurity flaw, location exposure from fitness trackers used near a forward operating base, and scenarios where altered overlays or implant settings could misguide a surgeon or a wearer. Risk is framed at the individual, population, and industry levels.
The talk closes with policy recommendations: open security standards, public security studies for medical devices, closer collaboration between clinicians, regulators, and engineers, and treating medical devices as critical infrastructure. A question-and-answer session follows on open-source design, research collaboration, and the ethics of commercial perception technology.
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