How a Covert Russian Disinformation Effort Is Bypassing Censorship

This talk looks at a covert disinformation effort linked to Russia and asks how it manages to get its messaging past censorship. It frames the problem for the audience: state-backed influence campaigns depend on content reaching readers even where platforms and governments try to block it, so understanding how that reach is achieved matters to anyone tracking these operations.

Through the middle of the session, the speaker walks through the campaign at the level of how it is organised and the routes its content takes to audiences. The material stays focused on observed behaviour and structure rather than deep technical exploitation, which makes it accessible to people working in threat intelligence, trust and safety, or policy without specialist tooling.

By the end, the talk points toward practical takeaways for defenders: recognising the signs of covert influence activity, understanding why blocking alone may not stop it, and considering how monitoring and attribution fit into a response. Listeners leave with a clearer picture of how censorship-resistant disinformation can be pursued and why it is difficult to counter.