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Fortress Island: Physical Security in Voting Systems

Drew Springall

Reviews publicly documented physical security controls and tamper-evident seals on deployed voting systems, exposing critical weaknesses in hardware defenses.

Summary

Physical Security as a Core Voting System Defense

Voting system architectures rely heavily on keyed physical locks, tamper-evident seals, and serialized security tape to scope voter interaction in semi-private voting booths to intended, safe operations.

Flaws in Hardware Access Controls and Port Isolation

Drew Springall analyzes vendor specifications, jurisdictional manuals, and field deployment reports, demonstrating how standard keyed locks and insecure access panels leave critical I/O ports, administrative interfaces, and memory storage slots accessible to voters.

Limitations of Tamper-Evident Seals

Relying on procedural seal verification as a sole mitigation for known electronic vulnerabilities is fundamentally flawed due to inconsistent inspection training and non-destructive seal bypass techniques.

Recommendations for Resilient Voting Hardware

Securing voting equipment requires eliminating shared mechanical keyways, implementing hardware-enforced port disablement, and pairing physical inspections with cryptographic vote verification.

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