Deception & Operations Planning Frameworks
Where
Talks
ShmooCon 2025
Duration
26 min
Shows how to plan a deception operation, using a rural trespasser case study to illustrate a practical framework.
Summary
Russell Handorf opens by arguing that many organizations still lack the basic controls that make defense work, and that buying a tool will not close that gap. He separates deception operations from honeypots, describing them as deliberate strategies that need clear planning. His framework asks planners to define the problem, the adversary they want to mislead, the duration, the budget and the level of complexity. It also asks how the operation will be dismantled without tipping off the adversary.
The middle of the talk is a case study from his own rural property, which had been unposted for decades and drew trespassers who hunted, shot, dumped trash and camped there. After standard measures such as gates, cameras and patrols, he created a fictional company with a website and signs carrying QR codes. Visitors who scanned a code were led through a collection flow that logged connection details useful for later legal follow-up, and a disclosure notice was added after talking with an attorney. He also describes problems, including an angry reaction from a neighbor and a visitor who ignored the signs.
He closes by stressing that deception requires sustained commitment, healthy baseline controls and a clear exit plan, and that it cannot be bought as a product. Some trespassers turned back while others did not, which he presents as partial success. The main takeaway for practitioners is to scope objectives, legal limits and wind-down steps before launching any deception effort.
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