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Damien Cauquil - Defeating Bluetooth Low Energy 5 PRNG for Fun and Jamming

Damien Cauquil

Breaks the BLE 5.0 channel hopping PRNG to predict future advertisement channels and enable targeted jamming of Bluetooth 5 devices.

Summary

BLE 5 PRNG Attack

Damien Cauquil (security researcher, Digital Security) presents a cryptanalytic attack against the Bluetooth Low Energy 5.0 pseudo-random number generator used for channel hopping in advertisement and connection events.

BLE Channel Hopping Mechanism

BLE uses FHSS across 37 advertising channels and 37 data channels, with channel selection determined by a PRNG seeded from the access address and connection parameters. The PRNG is documented in the Bluetooth Core Spec as a linear feedback shift register.

PRNG Prediction and Targeted Jamming

By observing a small number of advertisement packets, Cauquil recovers the PRNG state and predicts future channel selections. Using a software-defined radio, he then jams only the predicted channels, creating selective denial-of-service against specific BLE devices while leaving other nearby devices unaffected.

Impact on BLE 5 Long Range

The attack extends to BLE 5's Long Range (coded PHY) mode, which extends range to ~1km but uses the same vulnerable PRNG, enabling targeted jamming of medical implants and industrial sensors at significant distance.

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